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U.S.-SOVIET TRADE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
By S. OsoFsKv*
I.

The Course Of Soviet-American Trade: Economics And Politics
A.

The Background To The 1972 Trade Agreement

Before the Second World War, U.S. trade with the Soviet Union involved the U.S. export of machinery and equipment, and the import of
minerals and animal products. Imports were normally one-fourth or onethird of the volume of exports. U.S. exports peaked in 1930 and 1931 with
exports of $114 million and $104 million.' U.S. exports to the Soviet Union
never represented more than 2% of total U.S. exports, whereas Soviet
imports from the United States at times constituted some 25% of total
imports. 2 With political recognition in 1933 came hopes of a dramatic
upsurge in trade, but the failure to settle the debts and claims questions
resulted in the failure of the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide credits
to the U.S.S.R. as it was intended to do. The Johnson Debt Default Act
of 19343 made it illegal for private persons or institutions in the United
States to extend loans to the U.S.S.R., since it was held to be in default
in its obligations to the United States.
With the advent of the Cold War soon after the Second World War and
the failure of the two sides to settle the lend-lease debts, the United States
imposed a policy of denying its high technology products to the U.S.S.R.
via an embargo list and the Export Control Act of 1948.1 This net was
extended through the Coordinating Committee, or COCOM, to NATO
allies. In 1951, Congress abrogated most-favored nation treatment for the
U.S.S.R. and prohibited the importation of several kinds of fur from the
U.S.S.R., 5 and in 1954 it enacted laws banning the export to the U.S.S.R.
of military suppliers, weapons, and related technology.' At this time, the
sale to the U.S.S.R. of agricultural commodities for local currency on long
term credit was prohibited.7
All these laws continued in effect up to 1973 and the volume of trade
between the two countries dropped drastically. In 1962, 47% of Soviet
* Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee. University of Pennsylvania (B.A.,
1959); University of Michigan (LL.B., 1962); Columbia University (M.A., 1966; Certificate,
Russian Institute, 1968; Ph.D., 1968). Member, District of Columbia Bar.
1. Gillette, American-Soviet Trade in Perspective, 65 CURRENT HISTORY 158 (1973).
2. Id.
3. 18 U.S.C.A. §955 (1934).
4. Act of Feb. 26, 1949, 63 Stat. 7.
5.

Gillette, supra note 1 at 159.

6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
American exports fell from $358 million in 1946 to $0.1 million per year on the average
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imports of machinery came from the West, but U.S. trade with the Soviets
at this time amounted to a total of $30 million out of a total import-export
trade of over $36 billion. It was apparent to American businessmen that
Western Europe and Japan-including many foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations-were deriving considerable economic gains from trade with
the East at a time when the United States' need to expand exports was
becoming acute.9 By 1966-70, U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. reached $78
million annually with imports correspondingly at $54 million.'0
The Nixon administration in 1971 made trade overtures which were
officially sealed at the Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit in May, 1972,
when the two sides established a Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission to negotiate a trade agreement." What followed in October, 1972
was the conclusion of a maritime agreement, a lend-lease agreement, a
finance agreement involving Export-Import Bank credits, and a three-year
trade agreement.' 2 In essence, the U.S.S.R. was given MFN treatment and
a modest amount of Export-Import credits to finance U.S. purchases and
in return, it agreed to pay off a lend-lease debt of $722 million.
On July 8, 1972, it was announced by the United States that the Soviets
had agreed to purchase $750 million of U.S. grain over a three-year period
with U.S. credit furnished by the Commodity Credit Corporation. Subsequently, as a separate cash transaction, the Soviets purchased $1 billion
of U.S. grain. On October 18, 1972, a general trade agreement and settlement of the World War II lend-lease debt was signed. 13 As part of this
agreement, President Nixon extended Export-Import Bank credit to trade
with the Soviet Union. The general agreement, in addition to extending
MFN treatment (article 1), expresses the intent of both sides to encourage
and facilitate trade. If the expanding trade should result in market disruption, each country may impose unilateral import restrictions (article 3).
Article 4 provides for all currency payments to be in either U.S. dollars or
any other freely convertible currency mutually agreed upon by the parties.
Article 5 calls for the opening of commercial offices by each government
in the other country, but the commercial offices and trade representatives
and their staffs are not to participate directly in the negotiation, execution,
or fulfillment of the trade transactions. Article 6 provides in part that
from 1951 to 1955. U.S. imports from Russia dropped from $101 million in 1946 to $17 million
annually from 1951 to 1955. While in 1956 and 1966 the United States reduced the number
of commodities on the embargo list, it was not until the first great American-Soviet wheat
sale of 1963-64 that real prospects of trade renewal and expansion appeared. Id. at 160.
9. Berman, A Reappraisalof U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Policy, HAiv. Bus. REv. 140-41 (JulyAugust 1964).
10. Gillette, supra note 1 at 160.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 161.
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Soviet foreign trade organizations in the United States and private natural
and legal persons of the United States in the U.S.S.R. shall not claim or
enjoy immunities from suit or execution of judgment with respect to commercial transactions. In Article 7 both sides declare they shall encourage
the adoption of arbitration to settle disputes arising out of international
commercial trade transactions by agreement between the parties. The
Arbitration Rules of the Economic Commission for Europe of January 20,
1966, are to be utilized. Article 9 provides for a Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission to oversee and facilitate the agreement.
The Maritime Agreement, signed on October 14, 1972, 4 facilitates access
of ships of both sides to the ports of the other and provides that each carry,
whenever possible, one-third of the total trade between them and that
vessels of other countries carry the remainder. Forty U.S. ports and forty
Soviet ports were opened to each side.'"
B.

Trade Momentum Gathers Speed: 1972-75

In the debate over the merit of the 1972 trade agreement advanced in
1973, prominent American business executives, such as the top executives
of Wheelabrator International Inc., John Deere and Co., Pullman Inc.,
International Harvestor, Swindell-Dressler Co., and Brown Brothers Harriman and Co., came out in favor of extending MFN to the Soviets and
liberalizing export restrictions."' Business spokesman, Gene E. Bradley,
urged that expanded trade with the socialist bloc represented for U.S.
companies an opportunity without precedent. He quoted approvingly an
estimate that U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade would reach $3 billion by 1976.11 Frederick B. Dent, then Secretary of Commerce, called the passage of the 1974
trade bill "absolutely essential if we are to be able to proceed in an orderly
and expeditious manner to expand East-West Trade."' 8 Dent mentions, in
the light of the antidumping provision of the agreement,'" the problem of
deciding whether a communist export is being sold at less than fair value.
Since there is no market mechanism to determine a fair price, the best one
can do is to find out how much it would cost to produce and make sure it
is not sold below that cost. As to the problem of the determination of which
14. Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters, Oct. 14, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3573,
T.I.A.S. No. 7513, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1346 (1972).
15. Id. at arts. 3-4. See also Annexes I and II to the Maritime Agreement.
16. Prominent Business Executives Urge Extension of MFN Treatment to the U.S.S.R.,
AM. REV. EAST-WEST TRADE 32-33 (May-June 1973).
17. Bradley, East-West Trade, 8 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 39 (1973).
18. Dent, United States Must Be Competitive in Trade with East, AM. REV. EAST-WEST
TRADE 16-17 (May-June 1973). The bill became the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. §2432 et
seq. (Supp. 1976).
19. Agreement Regarding Trade, art. 3, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'Ls 1321, 1324-25
(1972). See the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. §160 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
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items threaten the security interest by their export, Dent says, we have to
ask ourselves how much of the apprehension which caused the original
20
listing is still warranted.
A U.S. delegation to the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission
meeting, led by George Shultz, then Secretary of the Treasury, and Dent,
visited the U.S.S.R. in October, 1973 and gave its support to the creation
of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade and economic council, a private corporation
which acts as an international chamber of commerce providing information on markets, trade regulations, etc. The Council opened permanent
offices in New York and Moscow during1 1973-74. Its membership consists
2
of leaders of U.S. and Soviet industry.
Throughout 1974, large-scale Soviet-American business contracts were
concluded. In early February, it was disclosed that a subsidiary of Chase
Manhattan Bank had signed an agreement with the Soviet State Bank for
exchanging business information useful for the promotion of SovietWestern trade.2 2 In early March it was disclosed that one of the largest
American accounting firms, Arthur Andersen & Co. of Chicago, soon would
open a Moscow office in order to implement an agreement with the Soviet
Government to aid it in the field of Western management techniques.2
In February, it was learned that the Soviets had asked three U.S. aerospace companies to build a seven-factory complex for commercial airliners.
Although the companies apparently were eager to sell jetliners to the Soviets, there reportedly was no chance the U.S. Government would approve.
Apparently some $500 million was at stake involving McConnell-Douglas,
2
Boeing, and Lockheed. 1
The Russians made it known as early at 1969 that they were interested
in American firms building a truck factory, with a yearly capacity of
150,000 trucks, to be located on the Kama River. They approached Ford
Motors, but the U.S. Government was reluctant to allow this, partly because of the Vietnam War. Ford withdrew from the negotiations, and the
Satra Corporation interested the Mack Truck Corporation. In May, 1971,
about a year after the Ford withdrawal, Mack Truck signed a preliminary
agreement to design and supply equipment for a $1.4 billion plant. But in
September, 1971, Mack dropped out of the project because of the U.S.
Government's failure to issue export licenses. In August, 1971, the Department of Commerce authorized an export license for Swindell-Dressler, a
Pullman subsidiary, for the foundry for the truck plant. On December 22,
1971, a $10 million foundry contract was signed. A second contract for
20. Dent, supra note 18.
21. Administrative Survey: October 1973 to September 1974, 7 LAw AND POLICY IN INT'L
Bus. 424-25 (1975).
22. Chase Subsidiary Signs Soviet Pact, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1974, at 45, col. 3.
23. Arthur Andersen Office Due in Moscow, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1974, at 47, col. 1.
24. U.S.-Built Jet Plant Sought for Soviet, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1974, at 41, col. 7.
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electric arc furnaces with Swindell-Dressler, worth $15 million to $16 million, was signed in October, 1972.25 As of September, 1973, two more contracts brought Swindell-Dressler up to a $43 million total in contracts.2 6
By March, 1974, some 65 contracts had been signed by the Russians with
U.S. concerns relating to the Kama River factory. Eight of these companies
were doing more than $10 million worth of business each. 7 These contracts
for some companies represent as much as 60% or 70% of their sales volumes. Swindell-Dressler's Kama contracts represent about 14% of its parent Pullman's annual sales in the engineering and construction fields, and
the bonanza represented by about $270 million of machine tools contracted
for the end of 1973 was expected to continue into 1974 with the Soviets
sounding out at least 45 companies for more than $150 million in additional
equipment. American orders for the Kama River project have been made
by a special Soviet purchasing office in New York. According to Chase
World Information Corporation, a subsidiary of Chase Manhattan, Kama
River orders assumed significance for the entire U.S. machine-tool industry, which had been in a severe slump since 1971.25
In late March, 1974, the Soviets announced the signing of a preliminary
accord with PPG Industries of Pittsburgh to build one of the world's largest
complexes for the production of plastic resin.2 9 On April 19, 1974, the
U.S.S.R. and an American consortium signed an $8 million design contract
for a $110 million international trade center in Moscow to promote Western
business. 0 Occidental Petroleum Corporation was to serve as general contractor for the project. Its chairman, Dr. Armand Hammer, said the designs would be done by American companies with the intention of using
American equipment. The U.S. Export-Import Bank approved a $36 million credit and Chase Manhattan offered a matching $36 million for purchase of American equipment. The Soviets were to spend another $8 million for U.S. imports. The center will include a 600-room hotel, space for
400 office suites, 625 apartments for foreign businessmen, an exhibition
pavilion, a 2,000-seat hall, plus restaurants, shops, and theaters.3'
25. M. GOLDMAN, DETENTE AND DOLLARS 252-58 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GOLDMAN].
26. Id. at 261.
27. Besides Swindell-Dressler, these were C-E Cast Equipment, $345 million; Holocraft
and Co., $19.9 million; Ingersoll-Rand, $19.2 million; National Engineering, $15.4 million; La
Salle Machine Tool, $12.4 million; Clevland Crane, $10.4 million; and Gleason Works, $10.1
million. Carborundum at $9.9 million and Landis Tool at $8.7 million hovered near this
group. Shabad, Soviet Truck Project Spurs U.S. Business, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1974, at
47, cols. 2-5. See Agreement Relating to Establishment of the Temporary Purchasing Commission, 25 U.S.T. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 7772 (1972).
28. N.Y. Times, supra note 27.
29. PPG and Soviet Set Pact for Big Plastics Complex, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1974, at
55, cols. 1-2. PPG was known until 1968 as Pittsburgh Glass Co.
30. U.S. Group Given Soviet Contract, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1974, at 39, col. 5.
31. Id.
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In May, 1974 it was announced that the International Paper Company
had agreed to exchange paper-making technology for- Soviet timber. No
dollar value was given on it."2 The Soviets earlier in the year had enlisted
Baxter Laboratories, an Illinois company, to supply technical knowledge
for the design and engineering of a $20 million plant to make food-grade
enzymes and related products.3 3 And in late June, 1974, the U.S.-based
General Instrument Corporation announced the signing of a multi-milliondollar contract that would enable the U.S.S.R. to begin mass production
of hand-held calculators.3 It was reportedly the first contract between the
U.S.S.R. and an American electronic component maker, and had been
approved by the U.S. Government. It amounts to a turnkey program to put
35
the Russians into the consumer calculator business.
On June 28, Occidental Petroleum signed four contracts with the Soviet
Union concerning a twenty-year, $20 billion chemical barter.36 This constituted the largest commercial transaction ever made between the United
States and the U.S.S.R. It would, once in effect, generate a $1 billion twoway trade annually. A week before, the Soviets had signed a $200 million
contract with Chemical Construction Corporation of the United States to
build four large ammonia plants, which constituted the largest single contract awarded to date for American technology.3 7 Occidental signed two of
its contracts for the design and construction of special port facilities on the
Black and Baltic Seas to handle storage and trans-shipment of the chemicals. These were valued at $100 million. The ammonia from the plant is
to be shipped to the United States and used to pay back close to $300
million in credits, half private and half from the Export-Import Bank
which financed the plant and port facilities. All these contracts are based
on a preliminary general agreement with Occidental of April, 1973 for the
exchange of huge amounts of superphosphoric acid from an Occidental
plant in the United States for huge amounts of Soviet ammonia, urea, and
potash.35 On the same day of the Occidental deal, the First National City
Bank of New York became the third U.S. bank to open a Moscow office;
it joined Chase Manhattan, which opened its office in 1973, and the Bank
35
of America, which opened just a few days before First National City.
Yet another contract of major proportions was obtained by General Electric in August, 1974, when it received a Soviet order for 65 gas turbine
32. U.S.-Soviet Pact on Paper Signed, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1974, at 58, col. 8.
33. Soviet Seeking U.S. Help in Industrial Biochemistry, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1974, at
41, cols. 1-2.
34. Electronic Pact Signed by Soviet, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1975, at 45, col. 6.
35. Id.
36. OccidentalSigns Deal with Soviet, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1974, at 35, col. 8.
37. Chemico to Build 4 Soviet Plants, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1974, at 49, col. 5.
38. N.Y. Times, supra note 36.
39. Citibank Opens in Moscow, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1974, at 37, col. 7.
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compressors valued at $250 million.4" These were to be used in the Soviet
natural gas pipeline system. On November 23, two U.S. petroleum companies concluded a $400 million agreement with Japan and the U.S.S.R. for
exploration of Siberian natural gas. 41 Under it, the Japanese ExportImport Bank is to supply $100 million in credits on condition that the U.S.
Export-Import Bank matches it. The U.S.S.R. is to spend $400 million on
exploration. A week later, it was revealed that the Soviets had placed one
of the largest orders ever received for underground mining equipment with
the Ingersoll-Rand Company. It was valued at $15.8 million.4 1 In February,
1975, the president of Gulf Oil was told that his company was being considered by Moscow as a potential partner in the exploration and development
of oil deposits off the Soviet Far Eastern island of Sakhalin. President Lee
43
did sign an agreement on cooperation in petroleum related areas.
In the wake of the U.S. Export-Import Bank's low ceiling of $300 million
in credits over four years for the U.S.S.R.," the U.S. private banking sector
is competing with West European banks to fill the credit void. The Bank
of America offered to form a banking syndicate to lend the Russians $500
million to finance imports from the United States. The offer was made at
a February 20, 1975 meeting in Washington of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade
and Economic Council. The Bank of America said the credits would help
counter the U.S. recession and improve the U.S. balance of payments. 5
But the Soviets turned in April to a bank consortium headed by Lazard.
Fr6res & Co. of France, which includes Morgan Guaranty Trust, Banque
Nationale de Paris, and several other West European and North American
banks.46 The loan of $250 million with an interest rate of 11/8% above the
prevailing London international bank rate is supposed to be the largest
private loan ever taken out by the U.S.S.R. It will be for five and a half
years. In turning away, at least temporarily, from a U.S. consortium, the
Soviets are underlining their determination not to be without alternatives
to U.S. credits, public or private, and in doing this to reinforce their warning to the United States, issued during the trade bill deliberations of 1974,
that Congress was threatening by its political conditions tremendous opportunities for American business in the Soviet market.
For the first six months of 1975, exports to the U.S.S.R. increased and
were 65% higher than for the same period in 1974-about $521.21 million
40. G.E. and Soviet Set Gas Turbine Deal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1974, at 51, col. 1.
41. U.S. Companies Sign Soviet Gas Pact, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1974, at 48, cols. 1-2.
The two companies were El Paso Company and Occidental Petroleum.
42. Ingersoll-Rand Gets Order of $15.8 Million in Russia, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1974, at 15,
col. 4.
43. Soviet Woos Gulf Oil in Drilling Deal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1975, at 35, col. 5.
44. The limitation was imposed in 12 U.S.C.A. §635(3) (Supp. 1976).
45. Bank of America Offers Credit to Soviet, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1975, at 1, cols. 5-7.
46. Soviet Signs Pact for Loan in West, N.Y. Times, April 12, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
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as compared to $315.63 million. 7 In light of the Soviet purchases of 10.3
million tons of U.S. grain in July"5 and an additional 1.2 million tons of
corn in late October,49 the likelihood is that figures will show the total
worth of U.S. exports for 1975 was more than triple or even quadruple the
$611.89 million 1974 total. This is based on the fact that the July sale of
two million metric tons of wheat by Cook Industries of Memphis and
Cargill, Inc., of Minneapolis was estimated to be worth some $470 million
alone on the basis of their current price.50 There are at least nine million
tons more to be evaluated, plus miscellaneous anticipated second-half 1975
chemical, machinery, transportation equipment, and manufactured goods
exports to be taken into account. All in all, thanks to an estimated Soviet
grain harvest shortfall of some 45 million tons below the targeted mark of
21.5 million tons for 1975, 51 it appears that U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. in
1975 will exceed the record year 1973 peak of $1200 million, which was also
largely due to a similar Soviet crop failure. This highlights the crucial role
since 1963 of Soviet grain purchases in stimulating sizeable U.S. trade
balances with the U.S.S.R., since Soviet imports totaled only $349.52
million in 1974, and were running only some $133.83 million in the first six
months of 1975.51
In fact, Soviet imports have always run well below U.S. exports, making
the Soviet-U.S. trade one of the most reliable sources of U.S. trade surpluses. In 1972, Soviet-U.S. trade transcended the high point of the 1960's,
which came in 1964 when U.S. exports reached $146 million, primarily
because of a $110 million sale of wheat. In 1972, U.S. exports to the Soviet
Union more than tripled to $542 million and in 1973 they more than doubled again, hitting about $1.2 billion. The balance has generally been in
favor of the United States and in 1973 the U.S. surplus reached more than
53
$970 million.
About three years after former President Nixon's first Moscow trip to
inaugurate a political and economic detente in May, 1972, SovietAmerican trade had undergone only a modest increase. In 1974, only 1%
of each other's exports were involved. U.S. sales to the U.S.S.R. dropped
from $1.2 billion in 1973 to $600 million in 1974 as a result of reduced
Soviet grain purchases. The net worth of U.S. agricultural exports to the
47. TRADE ANALYSIS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. TRADE STATUS WITH SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES 1, 11 (Aug. 13, 1975) [hereinafter cited as U.S. TRADE STATUS].
48. See Robbins, Soviet as an Agripower, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1975, §3, at 3, cols. 1-3.
49. See New Soviet Deals for U.S. Corn Set, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
50. Moscou Is Buying Wheat From Two U.S. Concerns, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1975, at 1,
cols. 6-7.
51. Farnsworth, U.S.-Soviet Grain Accord Nearly Failed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1975, at
37, col. 1.
52. U.S. TRADE STATUS, supra note 47 at 11.
53. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 20 (July, 1974) [hereinafter

cited

as OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTSI.
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U.S.S.R. had declined from $921 million in 1973 to $300 million in 1974.
Despite this disappointing fall in exports in 1974, the United States maintained its typical trade surplus, exporting to the Soviet Union in that year
$609 million in goods and importing only some $350 million. Listed below
are U.S. exports to, and imports from, the U.S.S.R. for 1971-73 in millions
54
of dollars.

Exports
Imports
C.

1971

1972

1973

162
57

542
96

1,195
220

The 1975 Grain Purchases

Once again, the grain purchases by the Soviets in 1975 have created a
new record volume of U.S.-Soviet trade and rekindled tremendous optimism about the future of Soviet-American trade. That the grain purchases
of 1975 will have more than a one- or two-year lifting effect on this trade
is guaranteed by the unprecedented five-year purchase agreement the two
countries announced on October 20, 1975.11 It is to take effect on October
1, 1976, and under it the Soviets would buy six to eight million tons of
American grain a year. From the American side, the agreement accomplishes the purpose of minimizing the impact on U.S. consumer prices of
erratic Soviet purchases on the world grain market, since massive 1972
Soviet purchases were thought to have created a wave of inflationary food
prices in the United States. President Ford noted in his statement welcoming the agreement that the minimum purchase of six million tons would
represent $1 billion a year in export earnings. 6 There is a safety clause to
the effect that in case the total U.S. grain crop should fall below 225
million tons-something that has not occurred in the last fifteen
years-the commitment to the eight million tons obligation is voided for
that year.5 7 If the Russians should want more than eight million tons in any
year, they are obligated to consult with the U.S. representatives before
closing further deals. 8 This clause is meant to protect the U.S. consuming
public. According to Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, the agreement
has the virtue of stabilizing the American economy and allowing farmers
to plan for full production and to make investments more confidently in
machinery and labor. 9
54. McElheney, After 3 Years, Detente Has ProducedNo Massive Exchange of Advanced
Technology, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 42, cols. 1-8.
55. U.S. and Russia Agree on 5 Years of Grain Exports, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1975, at 1,
Col. 1.
56. Id. at 60, col. 3.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Proponents of the grain agreement hold that predictable demand for
U.S. grain would encourage more farm production and result in stable food
prices. But one flaw is that the Soviets might resell the grain if it were to
their advantage rather than store it for home use. Also, the absence of a
firm lid on sales means the Soviets could buy beyond the upper limit of
eight million tons. Another objection is that the agreement does not really
unconditionally bind the Soviets to buy even the minimum, because in a
good crop year in Russia or world-wide they can offer a price to U.S. firms
that is too low and hence unacceptable. 0 In effect, this is an illusory
contract since one of the essentials, a specified minimum purchase price,
is absent.
While the grain agreement negotiations were unfolding, there was much
speculation that they would hinge upon the conclusion of a separate pact
for the purchase of Soviet oil by the United States at a price below the
prevailing world price set by OPEC."' Thus the apparent U.S. strategy in
the negotiation was to trade grain for oil and, in doing so, strike a blow at
OPEC. Reportedly, the United States sought a 15% discount so that it
could at least show the U.S. public that American negotiators would not
be as "soft" as they were in 1973. But the Soviets refused, because they
feared they might appear to be an adversary undercutting OPEC and the
Arab cause. 2 It has been pointed out that the 15% reduction would have
been only symbolic and of no real economic value to the United States
since the Soviet Union's maximum contribution might be 2% of total supply in the near term. 3 In fact, only a minute portion of U.S. imports-some
20,000 barrels a day in the first eight months on 1975-came from the
Soviet Union.
While the details have not been made public to date, it seems that the
Russians did give the United States an option to acquire 200,000 barrels a
day of oil at a price that would "assure the interests" of both governments.
This is linked to a second stage agreement yet to be negotiated by which
the United States would make advanced secondary oil recovery technology
available to the Soviets, which would increase their present production by
60. House, Soviet Grain Pact's Benefits Are Disputed As Finishing Touches Are Put on
Accord, Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1975, at 20, cols. 2-3.
61. Long-Term U.S. Grain Pact With Soviets Is Seen Hinging on Separate Oil Accord,
Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1975, at 8, cols. 2-3.
62. Cowan, Soviet Said to Bar Bid by U.S. to Buy Oil at a Discount, N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
63. The Soviet Union's capacity to produce and export oil today is only 150,000 to 300,000
barrels a day. It now produces 9.6 million barrels a day. U.S. oil imports in the first eight
months of 1975 averaged 5.8 million barrels with consumption averaging 15.6 million barrels
a day. Id. at 11, col. 1.
64. Imports from the Soviet Union averaged 17,000 barrels a day in 1974, 30,000 in 1973,
and 8,000 in 1972. Id.
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700,000 barrels a day, with the United States getting an option on the
increased production. "
Although the oil deal has contributed only marginally to the solution of
the U.S. oil shortage, the grain deal has been hailed as a successful tool in
stabilizing world commodity markets and promoting U.S. agricultural
exports to the Soviet Union." In addition, Secretary of Agriculture Butz
sees the orderly fashion of the sales as needed to counter the emotional
reaction against selling anything to the Russians." It is also hailed by
optimistic proponents of Soviet-American trade as some evidence of the
willingness of the Soviets to commit themselves to economic dependence
on the capitalist supplies and thus of the substantial long-term potential
interweaving of the Soviet and Western economies.2 This is meant to
counter the notion, propounded by those wary of the motives of the
U.S.S.R. in seeking Western technology and equipment, that all the Soviets want is to catch up with the West by massive technology transfers in
order to achieve eventually an autarkic position.
D.

Soviet-American Trade In Perspective

In the light of the inevitable euphoria over Soviet-American trade in the
wake of the dramatic 1975 upturn, we should examine the role of SovietAmerican trade in the larger context of world trade, East-West Trade in
general, and the respective foreign trade postures of both participants. In
addition, it is extremely important to characterize Soviet-American trade
quantitatively in terms of the structure. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union are large territorially, are well endowed with national resources, and have large and comparable populations. Such characteristics
do not usually make for a large volume of foreign trade relative to total
gross national product. Roughly speaking, the average value of U.S. exports and imports has traditionally been only some 8% of gross domestic
product. It seems that the larger and more resourceful the country, the less
it imports. There seems to be no correlation between the degree of economic development and the proportion of foreign trade to GNP. Figures
for 1969 indicate that the United States was the largest in import-export
turnover with $37.022 million, followed by West Germany ($27.101 million), the United Kingdom ($18.736 million), France ($16.221 million), and
Japan ($15.509 million). "9 While U.S. exports of merchandise have
consistently run 4% to 5% of GNP over the last two decades until 1974, in
65. Presently the U.S.S.R. exports 2.5 million barrels of its total daily production of 9.5
million barrels. About 1 trillion barrels go to Eastern Europe and about 750,000 to Western
Europe. N.Y. Times, supra note 51.
66. U.S. Seen Able to Add to Russian Grain, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1975, at 57, col. 2.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. M. VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 93 (1972).
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1968-69 England's ratio was 11%, Japan's 10%, West Germany's 19%, Denmark's 22%, and Belgium's 39%.'o The Soviet Union's annual foreign trade
turnover constitutes some 5% to 6% of its GNP, and in 1971, a typical year,
the U.S.S.R. ranked ninth in world exports." The U.S. share of world trade
in 1959 was 16%; this fell to 13.5% in 1969. The Soviet share of total world
trade in 1958 was 4.3%; in 1969 it had dropped to 3.9% with only 1.4%
representing trade with non-socialist countries.72 This data should be compared with 1970 data on U.S. and Soviet GNPs as shares of the world
GNP. The U.S. GNP is still by far the largest in the world; at $977 billion
in 1970, it constituted 30% of world GNP. The U.S.S.R. GNP in 1970
constituted 16.5% of the world GNP.73 This made it the second largest
GNP in the world, a position it still holds by a large margin.
During the 1960's, U.S. exports and imports annually grew faster than
the U.S. economy. Exports in 1970 were about $43 billion and imports
about $40 million. But 1971 produced the first trade deficits since 1893.
The U.S. Council on International Economic Policy quotes an estimation
that between 600,000 and 750,000 jobs were lost between 1964 and 1971 as
the U.S. trade balance shifted from a $6.8 billion surplus to a deficit
estimated at $2 billion.74 Agricultural exports are a significant portion of
total value of U.S. production,7 5 and their ability to generate significant
trade surpluses with the Soviet Union in 1963-64, in 1973-74, and again in
1975-76 portends a continuing key role in U.S. Soviet trade-a role enhanced by the 1975 agricultural agreement.
As of 1967, East-West trade constituted only 2.8% of world trade,76 but
it has grown spectacularly in recent years. In 1960, 70% of the international
trade of all developed countries took place among those countries; only 4%
was with communist countries. In 1965, the figures were respectively 74%
and 4%.77 But in absolute dollar totals, East-West trade has grown significantly. In 1960 it totaled $5.9 billion; by 1970 it had reached $16.1 billion.
In 1973 it stood at $30.8 billion. There was another spectacular increase of
33.9% between 1973 and 1974 to $43.5 billion. The total U.S. exports to the
East, mostly agricultural goods, were approximately $2.5 billion in 1973.
For the 1972-74 period, agricultural commodities accounted for nearly 74%
of U.S. total exports to the socialist countries. Yet even the heavy Soviet
wheat and corn purchases in 1975, as of the summer of 1975, represented,
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respectively, only 12% of total 1974 U.S. wheat exports and 18% of total
corn exports. These proportions should be roughly the same for 1975 exports."'
The United States is well behind its West European and Japanese competitors in developing exports of manufactured goods to the Eastern bloc.
In 1973, 72.7% of total exports of the industrialized West to the socialist
countries were manufactured goods. Of this, $12.4 billion total of manufactured Western exports to the East, $10.4 billion went to the U.S.S.R. and
Eastern Europe. The 1973 share of U.S. manufactured exports in all Western manufactured exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe was only
3.6%. West Germany supplied 40.9%, France 10%, and Italy 8.7%. This
U.S. share remained almost identical in 1974, although the value increased
absolutely by some 56% from $374 million to $578 million. 9 Secretary of
Commerce, Rogers Morton, believed this share to be well below U.S. competitive potential in light of the fact that in 1973 the United States supplied more than 16% of the industrialized West's exports of manufactured
goods.8 0
The total volume of U.S.-U.S.S.R. annual trade during the 1950's averaged less than $50 million a year. During the period 1960-68 it stayed below
$110 million a year except in 1964, when, because of massive grain exports,
it hit $184 million. The next year it fell to $100 million. In 1968 it was $99
million. It jumped to $177 million in 1969, then to $642 million in 1972.81
In 1973, because of massive soybean and grain deals, it hit $1,405 million,"
only to fall back to $961.41 million in 1974.3 Even at its high point in 1973,
U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. constituted only 2% of U.S. total exports for
that year. Twelve times as much was exported to Canada, twice as much
to Mexico, and $400 million more to Belgium. 4 In fact, total trade with
socialist nations during 1967-69 constituted only 0.6% of total U.S. turnover. 8
E.

The 1972 Trade Agreement And The Ford Administration

Soviet-American trade is essentially similar in structure to Soviet trade
with other industrialized Western countries, but one difference is the sporadic massive importation of U.S. agricultural produce. Aside from this,
the pattern of Soviet exports to developed countries consists of industrial
78.

U.S.
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U.S.

84.

GOLDMAN,

85.

T.

TRADE STATUS,

WOLF,

224 (1975).

supra note 47 at 11.

supra note 25 at 4.
U.S. EAST-WEST TRADE

POLICY

113 (1973).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

raw materials and fuels, including oils, timber, non-ferrous metals, diamonds, cotton, and vegetable oils. The leading Soviet imports from the
developed non-communist countries typically include machinery, equipment, and transportation facilities."' Increasingly since 1972, the U.S.S.R.
seems determined to involve the United States deeply in the process of
updating the lagging Soviet economy. It became clear in 1972 with the
October, 1972 trade agreement that the U.S.S.R. favors a quantum jump
in bilateral trade with the United States, and this remains clear despite
the failure of that historic agreement to be implemented because of the
Soviet refusal to accept the Jackson Amendment in the 1974 Trade Act. 7
This refusal in January, 1975 meant at least temporary nullification of the
1972 trade agreement, but hardly an end to the negotiations on the underlying issues, such as granting Most-Favored Nation (MFN) treatment to
the U.S.S.R., liberalizing Export-Import Bank credit ceilings to the
U.S.S.R., and settling the lend-lease debt. Ostensibly, the Soviet repudiation was based on the legislation's making the grant of MFN status contingent upon the Soviet agreement to liberalize its immigration policy. In
separate legislation, the Export-Import Bank was required to limit credit
to the Soviet Union to $300 million over four years.8 8 The Soviet undertaking to repay $722 million in lend-lease debts in a series of payments, two
of which already have been delivered, is now voided.89 There is cause to
believe that the real source of Soviet pain over the congressional action was
not the highly political emigration provision, which was denounced as
interference in the domestic affairs of the U.S.S.R., but rather the passage
of a pathetically small $300 million four-year credit, which would be wholly
inadequate to finance tremendous Soviet imports of U.S. technology and
equipment.
President Ford blamed Congress for the collapse of the 1972 trade agreement by scoring legislative restrictions as meddling in the conduct of foreign policy. The administration did give an indication that it regarded the
low Export-Import credit ceiling as the real culprit."0 The absence of MFN
treatment for Soviet exports to the United States would not seem in itself
a formidable barrier to the Soviets, since most of their exports consist of
raw materials which are generally free of duty. In the wake of the Soviet
repudiation of the congressional trade bill, the Soviets continued to conclude important deals with U.S. businesses."
86.

OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS,

supra note 53 at 1920.

87. Trade Act on 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. §2432 (Supp. 1976). This was the provision regarding
free emigration from the Soviet Union.
88. 12 U.S.C.A. §635e(b) (Supp. 1976).
89. Agreement Regarding Settlement of Lend-Lease, Reciprocal Aid, and Claims, Oct. 18,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 2910, T.I.A.S. No. 7478 (1972).
90. Congress Blamed For Moscow Rift, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
91. Caterpillar Tractor signed a $21 million contract to deliver bulldozers to the U.S.S.R.,
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A recent Central Intelligence Agency study of the Soviet economy indicated that the Soviet balance of trade with the West swung into surplus
in 1974 after years of deficit because of much higher process for oil, gold,
and other Soviet exports.92 The study estimated the Soviet surplus at between $500 million to $1 billion and said it expected this surplus to continue for the rest of the decade. The significance of this prediction, if
correct, is that it assures the U.S.S.R.'s ability to pay for a much larger
volume of imports from the West in the future without need of Western
credits. Students of Soviet trade question, in light of the almost insatiable
Soviet import requirements and the limited surplus of oil and gas the
S6viets have for export because of their own growing energy consumption
and their commitment to supply energy-deficient Eastern Europe, whether
the surplus will hold up long. 3 So, according to this view, Export-Import
Bank credits or credits from Western private enterprise or governments are
still crucial.
It has been suggested that the Soviets might build up credit or confidence by placing significant amounts of their repeatedly large gold reserves
in the U.S. as collateral. 4 Yet, another critic of large-scale U.S. credits for
the U.S.S.R. feels that if the Soviets were not so secretive about their
foreign currency reserves, they could raise credits through the Eurobond
market. This might be a more appropriate source than the U.S. treasury
for Siberian development funds.
Before his resignation as Secretary of Commerce, Rogers Morton was
extremely impressed with the potential of the Soviet export market for
U.S. businesses.96 He felt that a 15% annual increase in Soviet imports
from the West through 1980 is a very conservative estimate. If the United
States, with its present 4% share of the socialist bloc's manufactured goods
import market, could raise this share to 10% by 1980, U.S. manufactured
exports could be more than $4.5 billion by then, compared with slightly
more than $717 million in 1974. Morton viewed the Eastern market as one
that can put excess U.S. industrial capacity and labor to work and that,
and a $47 million cash transfer deal was reportedly concluded by Gould, Inc., to sell equipment and technology for a heavy-duty engine bearing plant to the U.S.S.R. The United States
approved the sale to the Soviet Union of a $10 million IBM 370/158 for process control.
Shabad, U.S.-Soviet Trade Has Been Soaring Despite Absence of a Ratified Accord, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 18, col. 6.
92. Soviet Has Trade Surplus With West, C.I.A. Reports, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1975, at
1, cols. 1-2.
93. Nagorski, US.-Soviet Trade Stalemate Won't End Soon, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1975,
§3, at 14, cols. 2-5.
94. Marer, Indebtedness, Credit Policies, and New Sources of Financing, in CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES IN EAST-WEST COMMERCE 142 (C. McMillan, ed. 1974).
95. Hewett, Government, The Markets, and East- West Trade, in CHANGING PERSPECTIVES
IN EAST-WEST COMMERCE (C. McMillan, ed. 1974).
96. THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 78 at 18-19 and 26-27.
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in turn, would create new jobs here and benefit the U.S. balance of payments. The Eastern bloc, in exchange, could supply needed raw material
imports or low-technology manufactured goods that would tend to displace
only other imports rather than U.S. manufactured goods. Since the socialist bloc's combined population is about one-third of the world's total and
occupies about 25% of the earth's surface with tremendous amounts of the
world's mineral wealth, Morton said that in the long run the United States
cannot afford its present discriminatory trade practices that limit U.S.
exports to this tremendous market and handicap access to these much
needed raw materials. Another analysis, prepared by the U.S. Foreign
Service, emphasizes tremendous present business opportunities in the Soviet market for U.S. firms, especially those marketing machine-building,
chemical and petrochemical, and power-generating equipment and technologies."
F.

Credits And MFN

It would seem that the issue of credits is at the heart of the matter of
Soviet-American trade expansion. Yet the Soviets insist that MFN treatment must be extended to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets argue that they should
not pay any price for the removal of discriminatory practices perpetrated
by the United States during the times of the "cold war." The fact that the
traditional Soviet exports to the United States are raw materials (like
chrome ore), which enter either duty free or with a minimal duty, is no
argument for continuing this discrimination."
The Soviets hope to export far more industrial equipment and manufactured goods to the United States. American companies have shown increasing interest in Soviet designs and manufacture of power-generating
equipment, processes in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, laser equipment, and mineral extraction. Several large American companies-Kaiser
Aluminum, du Pont, Reynolds Metals, Ethyl Corporation, and Andco
Inc.-have gotten licenses for Soviet processes in casting aluminum and
aluminum alloys in a magnetic field." Recently the U.S.S.R. licensed the
97. There also are high potential sales for U.S. firms producing components for the manufacture of automobiles, trucks, buses, and tractors; ground and aviation equipment, including
items for airport modernization; equipment for mechanization of agricultural activities and
for improved processing of agricultural commodities; and components for expanding and
improving the quality of the Soviet oil and gas pipeline networks. U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE,
FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 8 (April, 1975).
98. The Soviet jurist, E.T. Usenko, makes it clear that the U.S.S.R. considers itself an
advanced industrial power with an already large export line of high-quality industrial equipment and believes that in order to buy more from the United States it must sell more. Usenko,
Rezhim Naibolshego BlagopriiatstvovaniiaV Soversko-Amerikanskikh Torgovykh Otnosheniiakh (The Regime of Most-Favored Nation in Soviet-American Trade Relations), SOVETSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO (No. 9, 1974).
99. An American Company Buys A Soviet License, FOREIGN TRADE 36-37 (No. 6, 1975).
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Texas utilities service to employ its technique for the underground gasification of coals.10 The U.S.S.R. sold its Belarus tractors for the first time
to U.S. farmers through its agent, the Satra Trading Corporation. Tractor
exports already make up the largest single category of Soviet manufactured imports in the United States. In 1974 they accounted for about
$900,000 of Soviet-U.S. trade turnover, and the Soviets hope that 8,000 will
be sold in the United States during 1976.01 The Lada 1200 and 1300,
Russian-made Fiats, will be sold on the U.S. market for the first time in
1976, and the U.S.S.R. hopes within five years to sell 50,000 to 60,000
Ladas in the United States. The Soviets also have begun to sell cameras
and bicycles in the United States.10 Within four or five years the Soviets
hope to sell between $7 million and $8 million a year in machine tools 03
and to increase their exports of finished textiles to the United States.'0 '
Ara Oztemel, chairman of the Satra Corporation, feels that since the
Soviet repudiation of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act in 1975, $500 million to $800
million in business has been lost to the U.S. companies he represents. 05
Oztemel not only expects East-West trade to grow substantially in the long
term, but also expects an increasing number of high-quality consumer and
industrial goods from the Soviet Union to enter the U.S. market.
Michael Kaser, the well known Oxford University economist and expert
on East-West trade, detects in two Soviet decisions of January, 1975, signs
that the Soviets are turning away from the United States as their prime
source of Western technology and economic revitalization in the near future.'00 Kaser concludes that changes in the Soviet relationship with the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), taken together
with the Soviet repudiation of the Trade Act, point to much greater exchange with Europe, especially the Common Market, at the expense of
trade with the United States. He also feels that the U.S.S.R. is seeking a
greater trade role in Eastern Europe. If this is so, U.S.-Soviet trade projections will have to be scaled down, along with the general euphoria among
U.S. businessmen.
100. Id.
101. Wren, Russians Are Stepping Up Exports of Tractors to U.S., N.Y. Times, May 19,
1975, at 43, cols. 1-2.
102. The Russians Are Coming, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1974, at 50-52.
103. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1974, at 53, col. 2.
104. The U.S.S.R. is already a major exporter of textiles to Europe, Asia, and Africa with
$2 billion in shipments abroad in 1974. The U.S.S.R. is one of the largest producers of cotton
cloth and is self-sufficient in cotton fiber. Koshetz, Soviet in Textile-Export Drive, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 28, 1975, at 43, col. 2.
105. From the early 1950's until about three years ago, the Satra Corporation handled 50%
to 80% of all U.S.-Soviet annual trade volume and today handles 2% to 30% of a much bigger
pie. Satra's clients include IBM, Borg Warner, U.S. Steel, Bendix, British Plessy, and ICI.
DUN'S REVIEW 58, 61 (Oct. 1975).
106. Kaser, Soviet Trade Turns to Europe, FOREIGN POLICY 123, 124-26 (Summer, 1975).
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Some Structural Obstacles In Economic Detente

Whatever the merits of Kaser's analysis, the Swiss East-West specialist,
Willy Linder, feels that the obstacles to greatly expanding Soviet-U.S.
trade are not based in the present political climate,07 but in fact are rooted
much deeper in the fundamental incompatibility of the two foreign trade
systems.'"' MFN status makes sense only in a multilaterial, free-market
economic system. Linder believes it has no place in an economic order in
which the norms of foreign trade relations are established in terms of
planning periods and a largely centralized decision-making process in
which prices do not reflect shortages. Linder feels that the purely economic
importance of MFN status is rather slight in the Soviet-U.S. trade context,
and that granting it would not significantly influence the Soviet position
on the American market; far more important is the low level of competitiveness of Soviet exports on Western markets. The larger problem for
Linder is that the Soviet foreign trade system contains no decentralized
incentives for an expansive structuring of foreign trade relations. The
Western trader is bound to the state monopoly, which does not set its
priorities according to the criteria of a free market. Thus, the Soviet Union
cannot offer anything of equivalent value in exchange for its demand for
liberalized access to Western markets. Soviet trade, like COMECON trade
in general, is bilateral, and bilateralism is an obstacle to expanding the
volume of foreign trade. Linder concludes that the economic content of
detente can not yield anything very spectacular unless fundamental
changes are made to reconcile the differences in the two foreign trade
systems.
Edward Hewett objects to the granting of MFN status to the U.S.S.R.
on the ground that it in effect would be granting them monetary compensa1
tion for the costs of their overcentralized economy. 09
Moreover, it would
*amount to a subsidy of the few big exporting firms bound to make huge
profits from their exports to the U.S.S.R.-a subsidy he feels they should
pay themselves.
John Quigley recommends that the Soviets place greater reliance on
their individual enterprise and on contractual relationships rather than on
107. Recent articles by proponents and critics of East-West detente are numerous. See
Pisar, Trade, the Heart of East-West Detente, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1975, §3, at 12, cols. 2-5;
Laquer, Is Russian-American Trade Overrated?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1975, §3, at 12, cols. 25; Conquest, A New Russia? A New World?, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 492-93 (1975); Detente: An
Evaluation, 20 Survey 11 (1974); Grossman, Prospects and policy for U.S. -Soviet Trade, 14
AM. ECON. REV. 292-93 (1974); Nove, Can we buy detente?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1974,
Magazine, at 34.
108. Linder, The Economic Profile of Detente, 25 Swiss REV. WORLD AFFAIRS 4-5 (1975).
109. Hewett, Government, The Market, and East-West Trade, in CHANGING PERSPECTIVES
IN EAST-WEST COMMERCE 183 (C. McMillan, ed. 1974).

U.S.-SOVIET TRADE

19761

administrative or command relationships."10 The foreign trade monopoly
allows exports despite domestic shortages, prevents unwanted goods from
entering, and permits the sale of goods abroad at prices below their domestic price. There is not only excessive centralization with resulting problems
of bureaucracy, but also harmful separation of the foreign trade function
from the production function. A communications barrier is erected between the enterprise with an import need and the foreign trade personnel,
and also between the enterprise and the foreign firm which might supply
their demand, and the industrial enterprise is deprived of adequate incentives to engage in export production."' Yet a change in the Soviet foreign
trade mechanism at this date does not seem likely on the basis of recent
2
Soviet statements."
II.

PROBLEM AREAS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE

A.

Pre-1972 Controls

A major reason for the relatively low level of U.S.-Soviet trade is the high
level of U.S. legal restrictions.
In 1969, an Export Administration Act was enacted." 3 It retained controls on U.S. exports to socialist countries for reasons of national security
but emphasized the need to expand U.S. exports to these countries rather
than to restrict them. The 1968 Senate hearings, which led to the new
legislation, disclosed that about-S10 billion worth of goods was being exported annually to communist countries by non-communist countries with
only 2% coming from the United States. Thus, the United States was seen
as having effectively been cut off from a large market,"4 yet it turned out
that our restrictions did not hurt the communists, since they bought from
other industrialized countries. It was also clear that the complex system
of export controls had limited trade in non-strategic goods available from
U.S. producers. Certain policy prescriptions emerged: that the export control act would be amended to state expressly that trade with the East in
non-strategic goods would be encouraged, that security restrictions on exports should be limited to products that have potential military significance, and that validated licenses should not be required for U.S. products
that were freely available from other highly industrialized countries."'
110.
111.
112.

J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY 173-75 (1974).
Id. at 179.
Leites, The New Economic Togetherness: American and Soviet Reactions, 7 STUDIES
IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM 268 (1974).
113. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2401 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
114. For an opposing view, to the effect that the Western embargo served to limit only a
small proportion of potential exports and was not a major factor discouraging East-West trade
as of the early 1960's, see F. PRYOR, THE COMMUNIST FOREIGN TRADE SYSTEM 170 (1963).
115. Berman, The Export Administration Act of 1969: Analysis and Appraisal, AM. REV.
EAST-WEST TRADE 20-21 (Jan. 1970).
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The Export Control Act of 1949,1'1 under which the President could
promote or curtail any or all exports from the United States, required all
exporters to secure a license from the Office of Export Control within the
Department of Commerce." 7 The only restraint on the authority of the
Office of Export Control to issue licenses for export to communist countries
lay in a multilateral trade control scheme involving all the NATO countries (except Iceland and Japan)."" These parties agreed to embargo the
shipment of listed strategic commodities that were judged to contribute
directly to the Soviet bloc's strategic potential. The strategic embargo is
administered by a Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
(COCOM). In 1954 and 1958, pressures from NATO members challenging
the strategic significance of certain items forced some items off the list." 9
The U.S. philosophy of withholding trade with the East to gain political
leverage has continually irritated U.S. allies, who look upon East-West
trade as primarily commercial in motivation. The real leverage of the
United States over its allies in maintaining the embargo will depend on
how anxious the allies are to import U.S. products and technical data.'2 "
Under the 1949 Act, the list and accompanying regulations, while indicating when validated licenses were required, did not indicate under what
circumstances they would be granted or denied. This absence of clear
criteria was a matter of great concern to exporters.
The Export Control Act of 1949 was amended in 1962 to authorize the
President to deny licenses for exports if the products would add to the
economic potential of the communist countries and if that potential was
shown to be detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United
States.' 2' The Export Administration Act of 1969 eliminated the "economic
potential" criterion as well as that of "national welfare." Whether the
product will "significantly increase the present or potential military capability" of a communist country is made determinative of whether an export
116. Act of Feb. 26, 1949, 63 Stat. 7.
117. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2402(7), §2403(h) (Supp. 1976).
118. Berma and Garson, U.S. Export Controls-Past,Present, and Future, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 791, 835 (1967).
119. Oakeshott, The Strategic Embargo: An Obstacle to East- West Trade, 19 THE WORLD
TODAY 241-42 (1963).
120. Berman and Garson, U.S. Export Controls-Past,Present, and Future, supra note
118, at 842 (1967). The Office of Export Control also restricts the export of technical data,
including information conveyed orally as well as in written form. Id. at 791. The U.S.
Government maintains an embargo list significantly longer than that of COCOM. This is one
reason why Western Europe's trade with the East is much greater than that of the United
States, and it is a factor causing many American companies to conduct their East-West trade
through foreign subsidiaries that often can obtain from the host government export licenses
unobtainable by the parent in the United States. See Hoya, The Changing U.S, Regulation
of East-West Tade, 12 COLUM. J. TAs. L. 3 (1973).
121. 76 Stat. 127 (1962).
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will affect U.S. national security.'22 The Act stresses that if a given item
or one comparable is available from other Western sources, the licensing
authorities should consider granting a license so that U.S. sales are not lost
to competitors.2 3 But American trade with the East actually includes a
substantial business generated by American subsidiaries abroad which do
not appear in U.S.-East trade statistics. Exports to the East by these
subsidiaries have been estimated to be equal to, or larger than, exports to
the East from the United States by American companies.'24 In fact, foreign
subsidiaries or branches of U.S. firms, like U.S. nationals, are subject to
U.S. controls, which cover exports from one foreign destination to another
of items originating in the United States and exports of strategic foreignproduced products using U.S. technology. They are also subject to U.S.
control over certain transactions involving wholly foreign products, technical data, and funds, all of which are administered by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control of the U.S. Treasury. ' 2
Another export control measure is the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, the so-called Battle Act, passed in 1951.' ' No U.S. military,
economic, or financial assistance may be given to any nation which knowingly permits shipment of any items on either of two State Department
lists to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of
the United States, including the U.S.S.R. and all countries under its domination.' 7 The sanctions of the Battle Act are probably too crude to be
effective, since the invocation of them would leave a smaller country all
28
the more vulnerable to Soviet bloc influence.'
U.S. credit controls are another substantial obstacle to U.S.-Soviet
trade. The Johnson Act of 1934 makes it a crime for any individual, partnership, or private corporation or association to extend any loan to, or to
purchase or sell securities of, a foreign government which is in default in
the payment of its obligations to the United States.'2 9 The Act specifically
exempts public corporations created pursuant to special congressional legislation, such as the Commodity Credit Corporation,' 0 and special legisla122. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2403-1(c) (Supp. 1976).
123. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2403(b)(2) (Supp. 1976).
124. Hoya, The Changing U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 12 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 3
(1973).
125. See Doing Business With the U.S.S.R., Bus. INT'L 143 (1971).
126. 22 U.S.C.A. §1611 (1951).
127. The U.S. State Department drew up two lists-the first listing arms, munitions,
implemnts of war, and atomic energy materials, and the second listing other strategic materials such as electronic equipment, chemicals, scientific instruments, petroleum products,
metals, generating equipment, certain minerals, transportation equipment, and synthetic
rubber. Berman and Garson, supra note 120 at 836-37.
128. Id.
129. 18 U.S.C.A. §955 (1934).
130. Id.
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tion was enacted to exempt the Export-Import Bank from the Johnson
Act.' 3' By its terms, the Act prohibits merely the making of loans to certain
governments, but the view developed that deferred payment arrangements
for exports to countries subject to the Johnson Act, might be objectionable
loans. In 1963, when the opportunity to make large grain sales to the
U.S.S.R. materialized, the Attorney General ruled that sales by private
American firms to the U.S.S.R. on a deferred payment basis were not
objectionable loans but instead were legal credits. 32 The State Department
thereafter took the view that U.S. exports to Johnson Act countries on a
deferred payment basis, with or without bank financing, are permitted if
the credit terms are comparable to those extended for exports of the same
33
commodities to other countries.
The Export-Import Bank will have to play a key role in Soviet-American
trade if Soviet hard currency shortages in fact do require large credits in
order to subsidize large-scale purchases from the United States. One of the
reasons for the establishment of the bank in 1934 was to finance expected
Soviet-U.S. trade.lu Again in 1945 when it was given greatly expanded
lending authority,'3 it was expected that a prime beneficiary would be the
U.S.S.R. In 1968, legislation was enacted prohibiting the bank from extending credit to any "Communist country" unless the President determined this to be in the national interest. 3 It was thought at this time,
because of the 1963 grain deal, that the Soviets wanted credit for U.S.
agricultural exports. In 1968, legislation prohibited the bank from making
loans to any country assisting North Vietnam, with no discretion vested
in the President to waive this prohibition.' 37 In 1971, this legislation was
amended,'13 clearing the way for the President to permit bank credits if in
the national interest. This was done on October 18, 1972, concurrently with
the signing of the U.S.-Soviet trade accord. By 1973, the bank had made
four loans to the Soviets totaling $104 million and covering U.S. exports
of $230 million. The bank also had issued preliminary commitments for
loans of about $232 million and guarantees of an equal amount to U.S.
commercial banks if such guarantees were needed. Still, as the Soviet
appetite for credit grows, the big question is how much commercial banks
will give without Export-Import Bank guarantees. A potential legal impediment to commercial banks' lending without such guarantees was re131.

12 U.S.C.A. §635h (Supp. 1976).
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cently removed when the Comptroller of the Currency ruled that, for the
purpose of the 10% legal lending limit to any one borrower, a U.S. commercial bank could treat each individual U.S.S.R. borrowing entity sepa39
rately.
Soviet imports to the United States face antidumping duties.4 0 Dumping, defined as price discrimination between national markets, is, under
U.S. law, countered by the imposition of an additional duty against the
dumped imports, based upon a comparison made between the export price
of the commodity in question and its domestic price in the exporting country.'' Since in the Soviet Union export prices are not necessarily based on
costs of production, this presents a problem in determining what the goods
are really worth and what the production costs really are. The 1921 Antidumping Act allows the Treasury Department to utilize the "best evidence
available" approach; the price of a similar West European export to the
United States may be evidence of the true value on the similar Soviet
product. 4
Countervailing duties are a surtax imposed on U.S. imports that are
subsidized by the home government;"' the surtax is designed to neutralize
the foreign subsidy. Countervailing duties could, with justification, be
levied on virtually all communist exports, but if such a policy were even
partially implemented, it would constitute a serious impediment to EastWest trade and would be a difficult tool to use accurately because of lack
of information."
In 1951, Congress prohibited the importation of seven kinds of furs and
skins which the Soviet Union and China produced, but this provision has
been repealed."' Still in effect is the prohibition of imports produced by
convicts or forced labor provided for in the 1930 Tariff Act."' In 1951, the
latter prohibition was applied to Soviet crabmeat, and it constitutes a
barrier to Soviet Siberian timber exports to the United States." 7
In June, 1971, President Nixon terminated the executive policy begun
by President Kennedy in 1964 which required at least 50% of all wheat and
grain sold to the U.S.S.R. to be carried in U.S. flag ocean carriers."' Since
139. See Sauer, supra note 134.
140. The Antidumping Act of 1921 is codified at 19 U.S.C.A. §160 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
141. 19 U.S.C.A. §160(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1976).
142. 19 U.S.C.A. §164 (Supp. 1976). See Feller, The Antidumping Act and the Futureof
East-West Trade, 66 MICH. L. REV. 129-31 (1967).
143. 19 U.S.C.A. §1303 (Supp. 1976).
144. Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and Market Economies:
The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 482, 507 (1959).
145. 65 Stat. 75 (1951) was repealed by 76 Stat. 78 (1962).
146. 19 U.S.C.A. §1307 (Rev. 1965).
147. See Berman, supra note 173 at 509.
148. The provision was at 15 C.F.R. §376.3; President Nixon's deletion of it appears at
36 Fed. Reg. 11811 (1971).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

U.S. shipping costs were substantially higher than foreign ones, this requirement had inhibited Soviet agricultural purchases to some degree.' 49
Direct investment by a U.S. person in a communist country, like all
direct investmnt abroad, is restricted by the Foreign Direct Investment
Program.5 0 The communist countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia
and Rumania, are subject to the most restrictive investment limits in the
schedule. If the United States wished to encourage direct investment in the
U.S.S.R., the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
would have to be authorized to provide insurance against appropriation,
war damage, and inconvertibility of local currency holdings.,',
B.

The October, 1972, Trade Agreement

The 1972 Trade Agreement'52 and the related Maritime Agreement of
October 14, 1972,' 5 reflected the expectation that trade in 1972-75 would
at least triple over the period 1969-71. 51 A new legal framework for SovietAmerican trade was established, with reciprocal granting of MFN status,' 5
settlement of the lend-lease debt,'5 6 a procedure for preventing disruption
of markets,'57 government or government-sponsored commercial offices in
Washington and New York,' 8 and some assurances of facilities in Moscow
for U.S. businessmen.' 59 The Agreement also expressly provided that Soviet foreign trade organizations would not enjoy diplomatic immunity in
the United States with regard to their commercial transactions.'60 There
was also a provision that disputes might well be settled by resort to thirdcountry arbitration.' The Agreement also provided for a Joint U.S.U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission to monitor its implementation.' 62 The
Maritime Agreement specified forty ports in each country to be open to the
149. Hoya, supra note 124 at 16-17.
150. 12 U.S.C.A. §95a (Supp. 1976); 15 C.F.R. ch. X (1975).
151. Hoya, supra note 124 at 17-18.
152. Agreement Regarding Trade, Oct. 18, 1972, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1321
(1972).
153. Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters, Oct. 14, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3573,
T.I.A.S. No. 7513, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'IS 1346 (1972).
154. Agreement Regarding Trade, Oct. 18, 1972, art. 2(1), reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG.
MAT'LS 1321, 1323 (1972).
155. Id. at art. 1.
156. Agreement Regarding Settlement of Lend Lease, Reciprocal Aid and Claims, Oct.
18, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2910, T.I.A.S. No. 7478 (1972).
157. Agreement Regarding Trade, Oct. 18, 1972, art. 3, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS
1321, 1323 (1972).
158. Id. at art. 5(1).
159. Id. at art. 5(3).
160. Id. at art. 6(2).
161. Id. at art. 7.
162. Id. at art. 9.
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other 3 on the basis of four-day notice instead of the previous 14-days
notice,'64 and provided that each side shall have a right to at least one-third
of all cargos to be transported by its flag ships.' 5 Rate provisions for differ6
ent categories of cargo were established.""
The consensus of experts is that the significance of MFN status is primarily political.'67 Robert Starr points out that since Soviet foreign trade
organizations under Soviet law are independent legal persons with capacity to sue and be sued, the provision in article 6 of the Trade Agreement,
ensuring that they could not claim immunities from execution or suit in
the United States with respect to commercial transactions, was not a significant concession by the Soviets.' 6 Starr sees the mandate to negotiate
an agreement establishing an arbitration mechanism for settling commercial disputes as a significant provision, since mutually satisfactory machinery for adjudication of disputes is an important factor in the expansion
of Soviet-American trade."9
A. Peter Parsons points out a major weakness of the 1972 Agreement: It
leaves the 1969 Export Administration Act, with merely cosmetic improve1
ments over the 1949 Act, intact. 70
Despite the many improvements in the
legal framework wrought by the 1972 Act, the burdensome, labyrinthan
licensing requirements, which inevitably discourage U.S. exporters, remain.
Harold J. Berman stresses, in his analysis of the 1972 Agreement, that
from a Soviet perspective perhaps the most significant feature of the
Agreement is the fact that it creates a new legal framework within which
governmental trade initiatives on the part of the United States are beginning to evolve.' 7 ' He has in mind specifically the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission. Berman points out that the Executive Secretary of the American
Section of the Commission is also the head of the new Bureau of East-West
163. Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters, Oct. 14, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3573,
T.I.A.S. No. 7513, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1346 (1972).
164. Id. at art. 4.
165. Id. at Annex III(1)(a).
166. Id. at Annex 111(2) and (3).
167. Starr, A New Legal Framework for Trade Between the United States and the Soviet
Union: The 1972 U.S.-US.S.R. Trade Agreement, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 69 (1973).
168. Id. at 74.
169. Id. at 77.
170. Parsons, Recent Developments in East-West Trade: The US. Perspective, 37 LAw
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 550 (1972).
171. Comment, The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement from a Soviet Perspective, 67 AM.
J. INT'L L. 516, 520 (1973). Those views are generally reflected by Lopatkiewicz,
Institutionalizing East-West Commercial Relation: The Franco-Soviet Experience, 15 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 66 (1974), who says the Joint Commission marks at least a limited departure from
the basically citizen-oriented approach to U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations reflected in the cultural,
scientific, and educational agreements. The Commercial Commission reflects the expanded
concept on the American side of a governmental role in East-West trade relations.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Trade within the Department of Commerce. And he notes the fact that the
Office of Export Control has been moved into the Bureau of East-West
Trade undoubtedly facilitates the coordination of trade promotion with
security controls.'72
Peter B. Fitzpatrick believes the issue of most immediate concern to
both Soviet and U.S. businessmen is the availability of Export-Import
Bank credits, which have been minimal since 1972. '7 The threat of withholding credits undermines the future of the Soviet-U.S. energydevlopment negotiations. Trade might continue without MFN status, but
without Export-Import Bank credits, large projects probably could not be
financed. The liberalized treatment of Soviet organizations as separate
entities 7 1 could affect U.S. capital availability if Soviet development costs
funded in the United States approach $20 billion over the 1970's. This
could create a tighter squeeze on the U.S. money market, which, in turn,
would require either substantial governmental participation in the financing or some new approach to the problem by the private sector.
Jerry Pubantz suggests another potentially important impediment to
American-Soviet trade: the non-convertibility of the ruble. 75 This was
side-stepped in the 1972 Agreement by specifying payments in agreed con76
vertible currencies.
C.

The Future Of The Trans-IdeologicalEnterprise

With the first waves of petrodollar investment breaking on the U.S.
domestic economy and taking the form of both direct and indirect investments, alarm has been expressed in some quarters, notably in Congress,
about the impact of geographically concentrated foreign investments in
U.S. corporations, land, and minerals. Several bills have been introduced
to prohibit foreign ownership of certain designated industries and to limit
such ownership in publicly held companies. There is legislation pending
to authorize a comprehensive survey of foreign investment data and to
establish a National Foreign Investment Control Commission. A Joint
Congressional Committee on Foreign Investment Control has been proposed. The Ford administration's position is that no basis has been established for departing from the traditional U.S. policy of neutrality toward
foreign investment in the United States. Under present American legislation, foreign interests may not obtain licenses to operate facilities for the
172. Comment, supra note 171.
173. Fitzpatrick, Soviet-American Trade, 1972-1974: A Summary, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 39,
67, 71 (1974).
174. See text supra at.note 139.
175. Pubantz, Marxism-Leninism and Soviet-American Economic Relations Since Stalin,
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utilization or production of atomic energy.' Yet the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, formerly the Atomic Energy Commission, has allowed 50-50
joint ventures with foreign concerns for this purpose. Development of hydroelectric power sites on navigable rivers and streams is restricted to U.S.
corporations, ' but foreign control of such corporations is not prohibited.
Aliens cannot acquire or exploit mineral lands owned by the U.S.
Government, but they can control domestic coporations leasing such lands,
if their country allows reciprocal rights to U.S. citizens.'" Only six states
currently permit operations by foreign banks, and state laws on alien ownership of land range from a strict ban to no limit whatsoever on amount.,"
Clearly the stakes are too enormous to U.S. business interests abroad to
stampede toward restrictive legislation against OPEC investments here.
And there would hardly seem to be any imminent threat of a West European or Japanese takeover of significant U.S. industrial sectors. Least of
all would there be a threat along these lines from the Soviets.
But what of the possibility of significant U.S. equity capital being deployed some day in the U.S.S.R.? Is the most the United States can hope
for along these lines the mere role of selling merchandise, technology, and
patents and perhaps the leasing of equipment and persmnnel to the Soviets to be used at their instructions? What about some active entrepreneurial or managerial role by American businesses in the U.S.S.R.? Soviet
law still requires full state ownership of the means of production and blocks
foreign investment of equity participation and, in the absence of production information and monitoring by outsiders, there is no guarantee that
the proper royalties for licensed technology will be counted unless one
accepts an initial lump sum payment.'8 '
Yugoslavia and Rumania provide examples of the restrictions and requirements of trading with the Soviets. The first law permitting foreign
capital investment in Yugoslavia was enacted on July 27, 1967. By 1972,
forty-two capital investment contracts with foreign firms had been negotiated. A foreigner cannot simply invest capital. He must contract with a
Yugoslav party, establishing a joint venture through which he joins his
capital to that of a Yugoslav enterprise forming a Yugoslav corporation.
The scope of foreign investment is wide. Only banking, insurance, domestic transportation, and social services are prohibited areas. According to a
Yugoslav authority on these joint ventures, Yugoslav practice indicates
that social ownership and workers' self-management can co-exist with foreign private capital.' 2
177.
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By mid-1974, Rumania had established six joint ventures with Western
companies, Hungary had two, and Yugoslavia had more than 120. The real
breakthrough in Eastern Europe came in 1971, when Rumania became the
first Soviet bloc country to legislate in favor of joint ventures.
The East European joint venture is a contractual partnership which
creates a highly institutionalized form of industrial cooperation for the
Western partner to expand into Eastern Europe and thus get a better grip
on that market. The interest of all three East European countries utilizing
it lies in developing exports earning hard currency and bringing in the
latest technology and expertise in a self-financing form. All three allow the
Western partner up to 49% of the equity, with exceptions if special national
interests require it. All three grant a proportional share of profits and the
right to transfer profits abroad and provide for a joint management committee with 50% representation to the Western side despite its minority
ownership. In both countries, the Western partner's invested assets are
guaranteed. However, Western businessmen seem to prefer direct investment in East European enterprises and, if possible, an even larger control
over production than present legislation of the three countries' legislation
allows. ' 3
It seems that the core elements distinguishing joint ventures in Eastern
Europe from ordinary industrial cooperation agreements are pooled assets,
joint management, and shared risk. The Western firm would be attracted
to this form because its cash outlay involved at the outset need not be
great; it might take the form of contributing licenses, know-how, and specialized equipment. Moreover, the arrangement provides some measure of
control over operations of mutual concern not present in industrial cooperation."' The risk element is lower than in capitalist countries and is of a
very different order-more political than economic.
The American business view of the new East European variant of the
joint venture is cautiously positive. Emile Benoit, Professor of International Business at Columbia University, sees it as perhaps the best way of
tapping the tremendous East European market.8 5 The Western partner
will supply machinery, technical assistance, management advice and
world marketing channels, and the host country will supply labor, raw
materials, and the plant. Since the communist ideology holds that payment of profits to private owners involves exploitation of labor, it may be
necessary to organize the projects in a way that will minimize or obscure
the element of foreign private ownership. This can be done, suggests BePORARY PROBLEMS 474-75, 478, 484 (1972).
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noit, through the use of extended terms in the sale of machinery and
through Western acceptance of royalties and fees under licensing and management contracts instead of profit shares. These can be paid off in goods
rather than cash to improve the cosmetic effect. This also minimizes the
foreign exchange problems of the host country. In effect, the right to manage takes the form of a management contract rather than majority stock
ownership. Benoit feels that the most important advantage of all to the
Western partner in this joint venture is that it provides the opportunity to
produce goods in the East for export to the West or to third countries. This
is valuable, because Eastern Europe has a substantial supply of underutilized, skilled, and inexpensive technical manpower. The total control by
the state of labor and production brings stability and predictability of
production and production costs. Therefore, such ventures for American
business could be very profitable. Samuel Pisar's views echo Benoit's. 6 As
he puts it, an American company wants control, and a contractual provision for a joint management committee provides control as effectively as
formal equity. Indeed, a royalty payable in hard currency may be superior
to equity, Pisar says.'87
How likely are the Soviets to be seduced by the idea of the new jointventure-with-equity and management rights, as in Yugoslavia or Rumania? It may be that if the Western or U.S. private banking sector,
substantially deprived of Export-Import credits, is unable to finance the
unslakable Soviet thirst for Western capital, then the Soviets may have to
open up the management and control of joint-ventures to Western corporations as a substitute for these credits. From the perspective of the U.S.
multinationals, the arguments in favor of direct participation in the East
European market apply even better to the Soviet Union, since the U.S.S.R.
has twice the East European population, infinitely more valuable natural
resources, and vaster needs to service. It has the world's second largest gold
production and is one of the largest diamond producers, and that can stand
as collateral in place of the unconvertible ruble just as Soviet oil and
natural gas can. For the typical U.S. multinational, a production base
under its control to a certain extent in the U.S.S.R. would have tremendous profit potential. The risks involved would be no greater than they are
under the present Soviet version of passive joint ventures, but the active
management element and the equity interest now missing would ensure a
far more dynamic dimension in the context of a still very safe production
186. Panel Assays East- West Trade Climate. .. Entente of Enthusiams and Exorcised
Myths, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1973, at 52, cols. 1-6.
187. See also Perlmutter, Emerging East-West Ventures: The Transideological
Enterprise, 4 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 46-48 (1969). Perlmutter, Professor of Industry at the
Wharton School, advocates what he calls "emergence theory" and "transideological thinking." Emergence theory holds that the cooperative interactions between ideologically different systems begin unobtrusively but lead to unrecognized but substantial interdependencies.
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environment. It would be the best of both worlds.
The Soviets, of course, would be able to resort to legalistic cosmetics to
assimilate this rape of their Marxian innocence. Their needs are great and
the material advantages are mutual, so the right arrangements in time can
be worked out. The Soviets themselves have been involved for decades in
just these types of joint ventures outside the socialist world. They have sold
Soviet cars in Finland in this manner since 1947, and they participate in
mixed companies in Sweden, Norway, France, Belgium, and England.'
These have been, until recently, marketing ventures rather than manufacturing businesses. One might well anticipate a reverse flow of production
joint-ventures if and when the Soviets lose their Marxian virtue.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

It seems that the major American industrial multinationals, together
with their American multinational bank allies, are demanding that the
U.S. Government promote officially and institutionally their trade with
the U.S.S.R. In a time of economic slowdown at home, the Soviet market
has a tremendous potential for multi-million-dollar and even billiondollar, short-term and long-term sales and joint ventures. American penetration no longer is merely an attempt to recapture what the United States
should have had, but rather is an effort to open up the vast Soviet market
to American technology on a grand scale.
The crucial role must be played by the U.S. Government as promoter,
insurer, arranger, and banker. The multinationals are asking for an openly
activist U.S. Government role, anchored in a solid institutional intergovernmental ?ramework that ultimately will involve a series of commercial treaties and agreements, of which the ill-fated October, 1972, agreement is but the forerunner. The institutional base of Soviet-American
trade will proceed apace, despite what some see as a recent Soviet step
toward Western Europe away from the United States in pique over the
Jackson Amendment. To the extent that this shift materializes, I would
venture that it is merely tactical. Even in the short-run, the Soviets cannot
avoid excessive infusions of U.S. technology if they stick to their priority
of technology transfer from the West. There is no substitute in the short
or middle term for the "American connection."
The multinationals have argued effectively in recent years that the reason the U.S.S.R. has been unable to integrate efficiently modern technology into its production process probably lies in the very nature of its political and economic system, in the poor diffusion of technical information,
the institutional separation of research, design, and production, and the
inhibiting influence of low depreciation rates on the diffusion of new types
188.

Quigley, Soviet Foreign Trade Agencies Abroad: A Note, 37

PROBLEMS

472-73 (1972).

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY

19761

U.S.-SOVIET TRADE

of machinery. Moreover, it would take many years to put together the
industrial milieu necessary to copy U.S. computers. So the U.S. lead is
safeDespite conservative, defense-minded critics, these arguments, together
with the prestige and resources of their sponsors, should prevail. The only
questions are how quickly and completely. Perhaps the best argument of
the trade advocates is that, without new, large-scale projects such as the
Soviet connection alone can assure, profit expansion essential to sustain
the research and development so crucial to the American technological
margin will not be forthcoming, and stagnation will result.
Because of the growing institutionalization of government-togovernment commercial relations between the United States and the
U.S.S.R., which center around the Bureau of East-West Trade and the
Joint Soviet-U.S. Commercial Commission, there is a fair possibility of a
"family situation" developing between the U.S. officials (who have crucial
inside information on Soviet needs and intentions and the power to approve or disapprove of export licenses) and, on the other hand, the few
American multinationals which stand most to benefit from such information and favorable judgments. It hardly would be a novel event if the
regulator were suborned by the prime subjects of its scrutiny. The effect
would be to create a new aristocracy of exporters with tremendous leverage
over a significant area of foreign policy and with a vested interest in accommodating the Soviets even in matters not directly related to their breadand-butter stakes.
The Soviet market is lucrative for the multinational sector of the U.S.
economy. But it is highly doubtful that this is true for the American
consumer-oriented industries, which are more job-generative. Hence, tremendous profits for leading research-intensive sectors will not necessarily
generate massive or even substantial numbers of jobs domestically. Moreover, if there are more and more joint ventures in the U.S.S.R., the jobs will
be primarily for a small number of American technicians. If it should come
to pass that equity joint ventures in the U.S.S.R. by American corporations become a reality, there may be, in fact, an outflow or loss of domestic
jobs. It is certainly conceivable that GNP would grow impressively in this
manner while the unemployment rate remains stable or even increases. In
any case, the impact of American production abroad on the U.S. job market is a complex one and, when conducted by high technology enterprises,
does not augur well for reducing the largest class of the unemployed, the
unskilled. So the labor unions may prove to be unimpressed with the
prospect of American businesses relocating behind the Iron Curtain, where
they ironically can find cheap, strike-free labor. Those businesses could
ship back to the United States goods which might have been produced in
the United States.
There is another danger to domestic business if Soviet-American trade
and joint ventures blossom on a grand scale. The necessary outflow of
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capital could dry up the reservoir of domestically available credits and lead
to a credit-investment drought, with all that entails for utilizing domestic
production capacity to the fullest, for expanding and renewing domestic
capital stock, and for investing in the housing and public services sectors.
Finally, it would seem the cruelest of grand illusions to see in the Soviet
connection the solution, or even a significant amelioration, of the present
and seemingly long-run American energy dependence. Siberian oil and gas
simply will not be available at least until the early 1980's, and even then
it is hardly likely that the Soviets would want to mortgage it substantially
to the United States. Given their ever-increasing energy consumption at
home and the political imperative of continuing indefinitely to supply
most of Eastern Europe, as well as the desire to export to Western Europe
for political reasons, there hardly could be enough left over to supply a
substantial amount of the growing petroleum and gas needs of the United
States. So to see U.S.-Soviet trade in this light is to perpetuate an illusion.
The Soviet disapproval of the 1974 Trade Act was merely a minor setback on the road to institutionalizing mutual trade on a grand scale. All
the principles embodied in the expired 1972 Trade Agreement have, in
effect, become the minimum assumptions the next successful negotiations.
By that time, the ongoing economic realities probably will have placed far
more complex and specific items on the legislative and diplomatic agenda.

